Introduction
The problem of evil has been examined by many philosophers and theologians over the years. In recent years, the evidential argument from William Rowe has inspired intellectuals to reexamine the problem more critically. In this text Rowe’s evidential argument will be examined premise by premise to determine if this argument is sound, and to do this some arguments against his position will be observed as well. Rowe’s main objection towards belief in God is founded primarily on the idea being if God is truly good and just, He would not tolerate gratuitous evils. Now, Rowe is very confident all people must ultimately confess there are evils which have occurred, and will occur again, serving no greater purpose, completely unbeneficial for humanity. The notion of unnecessary evils must be examined, and one must consider to what degree the evils tolerated by God help serve a greater purpose. If Rowe is correct about unnecessary evils being evidence against a good and just God, this will be revealed upon investigating the counterarguments to his claim.
Considering the First Premise from a Biblical
Perspective
In this world where unnecessary suffering seems
to occur quite often there are those who have concluded because of purposeless
suffering God must not exist. Here is where Rowe begins the argument, in
stating the first premise being;
1.
There
exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being
could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some
evil equally bad or worse.[1]
The theist must first consider what knowledge the
Scriptures provide with regards to unnecessary instances of suffering.
Unsurprisingly, there is an entire book addressing this issue in the Scriptures,
Ecclesiastes is dedicated to addressing what appears to be meaningless in this
world. In this book Solomon wisely expresses how sorrow can be good for the
heart, better than laughter, because when one is lost in pleasure they fail to
recognize and care for those who are in mourning (Ecce. 7:2-4 NIV).[2] The writer later speaks on the need for one
to be balanced. Readers are told to not be too righteous, which could lead to
self-righteousness, but neither should one be overwicked, for there are
instances where the wicked live long lives while the righteous die prematurely
(v. 15-18). He goes onto state, “The man who fears God will avoid all extremes”
(v.18). In the conclusion readers are reminded on how apart from God everything
is meaningless, so people are to revere God and trust in His commands, for He
will rightly judge all the good and the evil (v. 12:13-14).
The Christian theist recognizes because there
are instances where people suffer horribly, as a result there comes those who
are sympathetic with the sufferer. For the one who has only ever focused on the
pleasures of life there is a lack of empathy and therefore a lack of wisdom.
The theist recognizes people are capable of being balanced, but the reason one
can be balanced is because the amount of evil in this world does not outweigh
the greater good. In the end, God will righteously judge all such matters and
the greater good will triumph over all evil. From a Christian perspective, one
recognizes God took direct responsibility for what had come of His creation,
and in Christ one has hope in a redeemed world to come.[3] So with regards to the first premise
presented by Rowe, the theist can argue even if there appears to be unnecessary
suffering, in Christ one sees God has paid a price offering hope of escape from
this fallen world. Therefore, when the faithful witnesses what appears to be
unnecessary suffering, one is more inclined to long for Heaven, and the day God
will bring an end to all suffering and injustice. Even the worst of evils
cannot cause the Christian to forget the great hope found in Christ, thus from
the suffering the Christian matures spiritually, and the greater good prevails.
The Soul-Building Argument
One argument presented to counter Rowes’ first
premise is inspired by John Hicks’ soul-building theodicy. Hick believes the
evils known in this world help humans grow morally and thus the soul-making
process is enthused as a result of evil and suffering.[4] Hick argues if in another world God made
humans aware suffering was for the sake of soul-building, such people would
have no compulsion to overcome evil, for they would recognize there was no
greater evils to overcome.[5] In other words what motivates humans to seek
out ways of overcoming certain evils in life would not be possible if people
could perceive of there being meaning behind every form of evil tolerated by
God.[6] What is interesting here is the point being
the potential soul-building resulting from certain evils is only possible
because there is seemingly excessive evil which appears to serve no purpose. The
paradox is soul-building happens because of the seemingly unnecessary evil.[7]
Though respecting the counterargument from
Hick, Rowe still seems to believe a person can determine how much evil is
necessary for soul-building.[8] Rowe explains how the number of those killed
in the Holocaust could have been less and the building of souls would have
still come as a result, so therefore there is excessive evil which serves no
purpose.[9] This reasoning should bring to mind for the
Christian the unjust suffering Christ endured and His unwarranted death on the
cross. The one who recognizes Jesus in history but denies His resurrection may
at first see the suffering endured by Christ as unnecessary. Yet even in
rejecting Christ deity the scholar cannot deny the greater good which can come
about as a result of one placing their faith in Christ. Rowe brings up the
hypothetical fawn who dies a horrible death for no reason.[10] One can just as easily imagine a scenario
where an innocent lamb is tortured by young boys for sport, and no one is there
to prevent the poor lamb from being tortured to death. If God desired to prove
the greater good is somehow exemplified by the seemingly unnecessary evils He
would have to directly connect with the fruitless death of the innocent. God
would have to prove His love shines all the brighter, thus hope is certain,
even when the darkness of evil is most prominent.
The Evil Only Appears to be Gratuitous
Rowe argues for their being an excessive
amount of certain evils incapable of serving a greater good and feels this is difficult
to deny.[11] Therefore, the second premise to the argument,
which will be analyzed more closely later, argues if God is real, He would
prevent certain horrific evils without preventing a greater good or bringing about
greater evil.[12] If God is the Christian concept of God, then
noticeably the human mind would be limited at understanding the mind of God. A
person must humbly recognize their thoughts and ways are incomparable to Gods’.
For just as His realm is higher than the human realm so must Gods’ ways and
thoughts be higher than a finite being (Isa. 55:8-9).
Stephen Wykstra offers a relevant counterargument
to the evidential and deductive stages of the argument sanctioned by Rowe. Wykstra
argues considering how humans cannot rightly judge the mind of God, what
appears to be an evil God is unjust in tolerating may indeed serve a
justifiable purpose.[13] Where Bruce Reichenbach argued Rowe was guilty
of appealing to ignorance, Wykstra recognizes this may not be the case for in
the example given of the fawn dying a slow death Rowe comments on there not ‘appearing’
to be a greater good attributed to the suffering the fawn endured.[14] One must wonder if the appearance of
unnecessary evil is enough to outweigh evidence pointing towards the
possibility of a greater good resulting from the evil. What is worth noting is
on how what appears to be the case for Rowe may not appear as such for the
faithful Christian. Wykstra refers to the Condition of Reasonable Epistemic
access, or CORNEA, which challenges what Rowe believes to be strong evidence
against God.[15] The wisdom of God would obviously be much
greater than the wisdom of man. When the finite human judges for what God
should do, or what He should not allow, this is like a toddler judging their
parents’ actions.[16]
What appears to be true for Rowe would not
appear as such from God’s perspective. Rowe has accepted the evidential point
to Wykstra’s CORNEA, but still feels the apparent excess of meaningless evils
in this world is enough for one to rationally conclude God does not exist.[17] Rowe does not feel God has any justifiable reason for tolerating
certain evils’, and perhaps this is because Rowe is not considering the kind of
God Christians’ believe in. One must remember when arguing against the
Christian God and using the problem of evil as a starting point, one is
attempting to argue against the morality of a God who created human life at the
cost of personal suffering. One is attempting to argue against a God who
personally endured suffering out of love for those undeserving. Considering how
God does offer a promise of eternal joy in a realm without suffering, when one
argues against God because of the suffering in this world one is rejecting His
offer. All the answers will not be discovered in this temporary realm of
existence. However, there is enough good reason to believe God is love, as
found in Christ. One can never fully trust in someone until taking the
initiative to enter a relationship with the person. In this world there is not
too much evil to prevent one from recognizing the greater good and having rational
reasons for trusting in the love of God.
Considering the Second Premise and the
Freewill Defense
In the first premise Rowe presents readers are
intended to recognize based on what can be observed about potentially
unnecessary evils, one should conclude God does not exist. Rowe asks readers to
consider the suffering of the fawn in the distant forest, a suffering which
serves no purpose.[18] Because one could rationally assume suffering
which serves no purpose does occur Rowe presents his second premise, which
starts with, “(2) An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence
of any intense suffering it could…”[19] To this first part Alvin Plantinga has
already agreed, but in his Freewill Defense he has successfully argued logic
permits one to believe God could not have created a world containing only moral
good without there also being moral evil.[20]
The second premise to Rowes’ argument concurs
the only reason God would not prevent certain sufferings is if in doing so the
cost would be losing a greater good or letting an equal evil or worse evil
occur.[21] Rowe, along with every other honest philosopher,
agrees Plantinga solved the logical problem of evil but when considering the
epistemological form of the problem the atheist has rational reason for not
believing in God.[22] Rowe believes the freewill argument fails
because any person can imagine a better world than the present one, where the
lack of certain evils would not take from the greater good. The argument is if
the world contained less immoral fiends like Hitler this would not take away
from peoples’ freewill to choose between right and wrong, and since God does
not prevent the extreme evils, atheism is justified.[23] What Rowe is actually saying is from a
personal perspective certain evils seem unjustified therefore one has a right
to judge God and reject Him.
When considering the second premise from a
biblical perspective one must remember God is a righteous judge. The evil
allowed is building up to a point where when God does bring judgement down all
will recognize He is a righteous and just God (Gen. 15:16; Dan. 8:23).[24] People may wonder why Christ did not return
sooner, as the early Christians’ believed He would, but God is patient and He
desires for many more people to become His children (2 Pet. 3:8). If Christ returned
too soon so many in the world who never heard of His teachings, His sacrifice,
the resurrection, they would simply be confused knowing nothing about this God.
Others would see the early return of Christ as a sign of Him seeking after
revenge and wanting to punish those who wronged Him. In other words, if Christ
returned too soon the entire gospel message would be misunderstood by most of
the world, and His justice balanced with His great love would not be freely
recognized.
In the present day most of the world has heard
about who Jesus Christ is and what He has to offer those who will accept Him.
Jesus made clear He would not return until the whole world has heard the
gospel, until all nations have knowledge of who He is and what He has done
(Matt. 24:14). Even today if Christ returned for all to see no person who has
heard about His sacrifice and resurrection could rationally argue He is wrong
to bring down judgment against all evil and those who chose to reject Him. Even
considering the profuse amount of seemingly unnecessary evils, if the whole
world knew of what Christ has done, upon His return and impending judgment, no
person could rightly judge Him as being unjust. Rowe is simply trying to argue
one is rational to believe God does not exist because of gratuitous evil, yet
in the same paper admits the theist has rational reasons to believe in God.[25] This just serves to prove God has created a
world balanced enough where a person can freely believe in God, for rational
reasons, or choose to argue there appears to be good enough reason to reject
God. Rowe is admitting his entire argument is not direct evidence against God,
but simply meant to show an atheist can rationally justify their lack of
belief, just as well as the theist can justify their belief.[26] This is equivalent to someone choosing to not
believe in God simply because one cannot see God, while also agreeing an unseen
God may likely exist.
The theist should sympathize with the point
Rowe is trying to emphasize in his argument. Wykstra is right to argue the
finite mind cannot understand Gods’ purposes for allowing certain evils, but
this does not mean God has no good reasons.[27] However, Rowe does not simply leave readers
with the hypothetical scenario involving the suffering fawn, but he brings up a
real scenario which forces the theist to respond. The theist is asked if there
is rational reason to believe God is justified in allowing the suffering
endured by a five-year old girl, who was beaten, raped, and strangled to death.[28] Rowe is wanting readers to ponder the
epistemic probabilities, and the critical theist should not overlook what Rowe
is trying to argue.[29] Though no one would argue for the rape and
murder of children being justified to serve a greater good, the Christian is left
remembering why there is a Hell for the unrepentant murderer, and why there is
an eternal Heaven for the child victims.
The main point to the argument Rowe gives is
the claim there are certain evils which no greater good can outweigh, or
defeat.[30] Simply stating one cannot be certain this is
true because one cannot understand the mind of God, does not seem good enough
for Rowe and others, when considering the rape and murder of a five-year-old
girl. The theist is called to recognize every incident of horrific evil, which
cannot be countered with greater redeeming good, lowers the probability of God
existing.[31] The theist must determine if this is a
rational and fair proposition. Perhaps the Christian should take a moment and
reflect on a truth which has been determined by statistical probabilities.
Wherever and whenever the church is the most comfortable the church is the
weakest. Where there is the increase of pleasure and comfort the growth of the
church decreases, and there is an increase of those who leave the church.
Wherever and whenever there is an increase of unjustified persecution against
the church, there is the increase of faith and often the church grows. Even
when those against the church provide the lowest estimates these numbers prove
despite the persecution, or because of the persecution, the church in China is
growing rapidly.[32] Furthermore, the persecuted Christians in the
Middle East do not take what non-believers would deem the easier route and
choose to renounce their faith.[33]
The argument Rowe presents is the kind meant
to encourage like-minded peers, proving worthwhile to atheists, but not so
impressive to the intellectual theist.[34] The one who supports the freewill defense has
already established the existence of God is not incompatible with the degree of
evil known in this world, nor even the apparently pointless evil.[35] Imagine a righteous judge has promised to
bring justice against all the criminals in the City of Despondency. Furthermore,
this judge promises compensation for the innocent victims, ten times from the
amount they had lost or suffered. If the judge proves able to accomplish what
was promised the judge cannot rightly be labeled as unjust for not arriving to
the city sooner. If the judge can prove righteousness prevails over the lesser
evil, then even the worst of evils cannot be used as an argument against the
justice served by such a judge. Arguing the instances of seemingly meaningless
suffering is evidence against God fails on multiple levels. This argument does
not prove so rational an argument to counter neither the freewill defense, nor
the soul-building argument, and neither the Calvinist view of Gods' grace or
the Arminian.[36] If one can present evidence for the justice
and love of God far surpassing the evil known in this world, this is enough to believe
in the Christian God, regardless of some apparently senseless evils.
Apart from Christ Rowe would be Correct
The
Christian must argue against the proposal given by Rowe while bearing Christ in
mind. Many still proclaim Rowe presented a solid and praiseworthy argument
against theism. Nick Trakakis even stated, ‘the only rational course of action
left for the theist to take is to abandon theism and convert to atheism.’[37] Therefore,
in concluding the argument Rowe asserts;
“(3)
There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.”[38]
Rowe
assumes this to be true, because of personal observations of apparent evils
which do not serve a greater good, or hypothetical evils which God should not tolerate.
If there was no notion of there being some great evil necessary to overcome,
the entire gospel message would be meaningless. All true stories and those
inspired by truth often involve characters' who stand against seemingly
impossible odds. When one hears of an innocent child being brutally tortured
and murdered the hearts of most have not grown so cold to leave one unmoved by
such an unnecessary evil act. No, most people who hear of such despicable evil
feel anger against a cruel world capable of such unnecessary suffering, and one
also feels remorse. In the least all people will recognize the world needs to
change and is very broken. The Christian is at an advantage, for their very
faith is grounded in the suffering of their Lord. The temporary trials and
suffering in this world are expected, but the hope Christ gives proves far
superior.[39] Because
of the evil Christ allowed to be done to Him, because of His suffering and sacrificial
death the Christian is empowered to express humility and share the love of
Christ even when facing the greatest of evils.[40] Again,
the argument Rowe presents may make sense to an atheist, but from the
perspective of the Christian theist Rowe presents no valid evidence against God,
whatsoever.
Missionaries
often recognize those in the most hopeless of situations are more likely to
respond to Christ than those who come from the most prosperous and pleasure
ridden places. For the child dying of Aids in Africa the only hope the one
suffering has is found in Christ. For the widow in a war-torn village after a genocidal
raid resulted in the deaths of her children, if not for knowing her family
loved Jesus, and belief in eternal life, the widow would be left
hopeless.
(1)
Even the greatest of evils cannot make hope
in Christ obsolete, or break the spirit of the faithful.
(2)
In the face of the most horrible evils, for
the Christian their hope in Christ increases, so the greater good proves more
evident.
(3)
The Christian recognizes there are many
gratuitous evils in this world seeming to serve no purpose, but at the same
time this truth affirms the world needs a Savior.
(4)
The greatest of evils do not extinguish hope
in a greater good, but the greatest of evils compels the faithful to depend on
the love of Christ even more.
(5)
Since there is no evil which proves so
powerful as to extinguish the hope of the Christian, but instead only increases
ones' hope in Christ, then it would appear there are no gratuitous evils which fail
to amplify the greater good.
This
argument only proves illogical if faith in Christ proves to be in vain. Since
history has proven without the use of force or intimidation faith in Christ
grows even more despite suffering, this proves hope cannot be extinguished. God
allowed certain evils so His love would be fully recognized in Christ upon Him
defeating evil and death on the cross.[41]
This also serves to prove apart from Christ not only is all suffering
meaningless, but all is meaningless. Since most people recognize there is hope
despite the excessive evil in this world, hope proves more powerful,
particularly hope in Christ. For the Christian who loses a child, even if by
some horrible circumstance such as the child being murdered, their hope is found
in Christ, and Christ alone. When the faithful suffer their longing for Heaven
increases, along with the desire to tell others about the only hope there is.
Rowe attempts to
argue all people recognize there are meaningless evils serving no purpose, thus
God must not exist. This argument has been analyzed from multiple perspectives
but ultimately apart from faith in Christ Rowe would be correct. There are
horrible evils in this world, but the amount of evil does not overpower the
greater good. Since seemingly meaningless evil only serves to test and improve
on the faith of the Christian the hope one has in Christ proves relevant, and
thus the evils in this world can help guide one towards a greater good.
Adams, Marilyn McCord and Adams, Robert
Merrihew. The Problem of Evil.
Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Feinberg,
John S. The Many Faces of Evil. Wheaton,
IL: Crossway, 2004.
Hick, John. Evil and the God of Love. New; New; ed.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. doi:10.1057/9780230283961.
Hopkins,
Philip O. "IRAN'S ETHNIC CHRISTIANS: THE ASSYRIANS AND THE
ARMENIANS." Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 61,
no. 1 (03, 2018): 137-52, http://ezproxy.liberty.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/docview/2048051607?accountid=12085.
Johnson, David Kyle. "A Refutation of Skeptical
Theism." Sophia 52, no. 3 (2013): 425-445
Lewis, C.S. The C.S. Lewis
Signature Classics: The Problem of Pain. Broadway: NY, HarperOne, 2017.
Plantinga,
Alvin. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand
Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1974.
Rowe,
William L. and Trakakis, Nick. William L.
Rowe on Philosophy of Religion. New York, NY: Routledge, 2016.
Rowe,
William L. "Plantinga on Possible Worlds and Evil." The
Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 17 (1973): 554-55. doi:10.2307/2025309.
Strobel,
Lee. The Case for Faith. Grand
Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 2000.
Trakakis,
Nick. The God Beyond Belief: In Defence of William Rowe's Evidential
Argument from Evil. Vol. 27;27.;. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007;2006;.
doi:10.1007/1-4020-5145-X.
Wright,
N.T. Evil and the Justice of God. Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006.
Wykstra, Stephen J., Timothy Perrine, and The Society of Christian
Philosophers. "Foundations of Skeptical Theism: CORNEA, CORE, and
Conditional Probabilities." Faith and Philosophy 29, no.
4 (2012): 375-399.
Yung, Hwa. "The Church in China Today." Transformation 21,
no. 2 (2004): 126-128.
[1]
William L. Rowe, Nick Trakakis, William L. Rowe on Philosophy of Religion,
(New
York, NY: Routledge, 2016), 336.
[2]
Unless otherwise noted, all biblical passages
referenced are in the New International
Version (Indianapolis, IN: Zondervan, 1990).
[4] John Hick, Evil and the God
of Love, (New; New; ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 256-257.
[5]
John S. Feinberg, The
Many Faces of Evil, (Wheaton,
IL: Crossway, 2004), 222.
[6]
Ibid.
[7]
Ibid.
[8]
Ibid.
[10] Marilyn Adams and Robert Adams, The Problem of Evil, 143.
[13]
Marilyn Adams and Robert
Adams, The Problem of Evil, 155.
[14]
Ibid., 130.
[15]
Ibid., 152.
[16]
Ibid., 155.
[17]
Stephen J. Wykstra and
Timothy Perrine, and The Society of Christian Philosophers, “Foundations of
Skeptical Theism: CORNEA, CORE, and Conditional Probabilities," (Faith
and Philosophy 29, no. 4 (2012), 376.
[19]
Ibid., 336.
[20]
Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, (Grand Rapids,
MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1974), 44.
[22]
William L. Rowe, "Plantinga on Possible Worlds and Evil," The
Journal of Philosophy 70, no. 17 (1973), 555.
[23]
Rowe, "Plantinga
on Possible Worlds and Evil," 555.
[24]
N.T. Wright, Evil and the Justice of God, (Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 44.
[27]
Feinberg, 230.
[28]
David
Kyle Johnson, "A Refutation of Skeptical Theism," Sophia 52,
no. 3 (2013), 426.
[29]
Johnson,
"A Refutation of Skeptical Theism," 427.
[30]
Ibid.
[31]
Ibid., 429.
[32]
Hwa Yung, "The Church in
China Today," (Transformation 21, no. 2 (2004), 126.
[33]
Philip O. Hopkins,
"IRAN'S ETHNIC CHRISTIANS: THE ASSYRIANS AND THE ARMENIANS," Journal
of the Evangelical Theological Society 61, no. 1 (03, 2018), 152.
[35]
Ibid., 243.
[36]
Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil, 363.
[37]
Nick Trakakis, The God
Beyond Belief: In Defense of William Rowe's Evidential Argument from Evil, (Vol.
27;27.;. Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), 341.
[38]
Rowe, William L. Rowe on Philosophy of Religion, 336.
[39]
Lee Strobel, The Case for Faith, Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan Publishing House, 2000), 54.
[40]
C.S. Lewis, The C.S. Lewis Signature Classics: The Problem of Pain, (Broadway:
NY, HarperOne, 2017), 610-611.
[41] Norman L. Geisler and Frank Turek, I Don’t Have Enough Faith to be an Atheist, (Wheaton, IL. Crossway
Books, 2004), 400.
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